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Abstract
In this study, a compreensive analysis on the union wage gap is performed from the
factors that influence the incidence of union membership to its compensation.
It is clear that contractually protected and more firm attached workers, in larger firms,
are the backbone of unions. Worker’s characteristics are greatly neglectable in altering the
incidence rate of unionization. Unionization finds more prevalence in sectors which are
protected from broad competition and have previously publicly owned firms.
It is evidenced that the union wage gap ceases to grow when a majority of the workers
are unionized - an interesting match with the American system of workplace votings. On
average, the Portuguese union wage gap is about 19,76 percent which is greater than the
American and British consensus of 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
Decomposing the gap by types of compensation we show the influence of taxation and
the strategic interaction at the bargaining table, as unions place special emphasis on wage
supplements allowing firms to partially offset its increase by lowering compensation related
with the working time.
Resorting to the Decomposition of Gelbach (2009) we show that unions materialize their
gap primarily through a change in the firm’s compensation policy, and secondarily through
the change in the definition of job positions and promotion rules. Finally, it is shown that
the average unionized worker is less productive.
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1 Introduction.
Collective bargaining formalizes at aggregate level the wage determination process, reducing firm
discretion and forcing the sides to commit. It is commonly assumed that unions are capable of
creating compensation differentials and obtaining non-pecuniary benefits for their members, as
collective bargaining forces employers (often with governmental intervention) to commit against
an entity with market power instead of dealing with each worker individually. Farber (2001)
extensively reviewed the role of unions and analysed the dispute resolution instruments: strikes
and arbitration. Strikes, in particular, are a specific source of the bargaining power of unions.
Unions are then capable of extracting a higher share of the firms’ rents.
In Portugal, and broadly in Europe, the fall in union density didn’t lead to a fall in union
coverage, leaving barely untouched the ability of unions to influence labour contracts. According
to Blanchflower et al. (2002), that ability did not reduce its capacity to influence macroeconomic
behaviour over time, at least in UK and US.1
At the European Union level, 66% of workers are covered by collective agreements, a value that
is above 80% for the top ten european economies in that category. In 2010, 92% of the privately
employed portuguese workers were covered by some instrument of collective bargaining.2 and
the country’s union density has developed as in Table 1.3
Year 1980 1990 1995 1998 2010
Union Density 52% 40% 30% 25% 10.38%
Table 1 - Union Density in Portugal.
In this thesis the discussion of the collective bargaining institutions is the core of part II. In
part III we present the database which is used in this study. The decision of acquiring union
membership will be discussed in part IV, resorting to count models in order to shed more light
on the mechanism of unionization. Then, in part V, the focus will be in deriving the benefit
in the gross compensation of workers which are unionized, using the benchmark models of the
literature and developing a way of producing a nonlinear semiparametric relationship between
the benefit and the level of union density. Finally, in part VI the mechanism underlying the
creation of the gap is studied considering three dimensions - the compensation policy, the job
title policy and the average worker’s productivity.
1The evolution of union wage gap was untrended until mid 1990’s on both countries (Blanchflower and Bryson,
2002).
2See Figure 2.
3The values between 1980 and 1998 are provided by Blanchflower et al. (2002) and the value for 2010 computed
resorting to Quadros de Pessoal 2010.
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2 Importance of bargaining and the framework of bargain-
ing in Portugal in 2010.
Collective bargaining is the core for the production of labour legislation in Portugal, creating a
set of mandatory wage floors and allowing frequent and leading governmental intervenction.
The negotiation of working conditions4 , between unions and employers’ federations, often
with governmental intermediation, lies at the core of the system. In what is called Convenção
Colectiva de Trabalho5 , the agreement is settled for an entire sector or industry, while in the
context of Acordo Colectivo de Trabalho6 the agreement only binds the subscribers. The results
of this instrument could be extended by the Ministry to other firms in the same sector through
Portarias de Extenção7 at the request of employers’ federations or unions.8 The Ministry can
even extend, at request of unions, Convenção Colectiva de Trabalho or Acordo Colectivo de
Trabalho to other sectors with workers in similar conditions.
In the case of absence of one of the representatives or the existence of strategic delays in the
negotiation or constant denials of an agreement, the Ministry of Employment can regulate the
sector directly through Portaria de Condições de Trabalho9 .
According to Torres et al. (2013), a distinct feature of the portuguese system is "the par-
allelism or overlapping of collective agreements" created by the frequent coexistance of several
collective agreements covering a single enterprise, especially when it develops activities in differ-
ent sectors and/or industries.
In that parallelism, the principle of most favorable treatment imposes that the most beneficial
instrument to the worker must be applied. This outcome becomes binding not only for the current
contracts, but also for future similar individual contracts.
At workplace level, firms and workers’ councils agreements, may set more beneficial conditions
than what was ruled at a broader level, through Acordo de Empresa.10 However, given the often
stringent terms approved at industry and/or sector level, this instrument has a small impact.11
The institutional framework presented, leads Caju et al. (2008) to emphasize that the system
of wage formation in Portugal is a "broadly regulated system of wage bargaining", and Torres
et al. (2013) state that decentralized bargaining occurs mainly in large and previously public
enterprises - a small share of the participants in the market.
According to Quadros de Pessoal 2010 the instruments of collective agreement had a coverage
4Naturally the enumerated instruments tend to be focused on the settlement of a system of wage floors, but
other working conditions (i.e. schedule or paid holidays) are often discussed.
5 In English a possible translation may be Collective Convention of Labour.
6 In English a possible translation may be Collective Agreement of Labour.
7 In Ensligh a possible translation may be Regulation of Extention.
8 It is not unusual to see both sides lobbying to enlarge the franchise of the agreement. The unions may have
the incentive to do so in order to increase coverage, while federations may have incentives to avoid gains for firms
which are not included in the collective agreement and hence are not members of the federation.
9 In English a possible translation may be Regulation of Working Conditions.
10An English possible translation may be Firm Agreement.
11See Figure 2.
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in employed workers of the private sector as seen in table 2.12
Privatly Employed Workers 2 603 853
Collective Convention of Labour 78,28%
Collective Agreement of Labour 3,51%
Firm Agreement 3,59%
Regulation of Working Conditions/Regulation of Extention 6,67%
Not Covered 7,98%
Table 2 - Coverage of Instruments of Collective
Bargaining at Worker Level in 2010. Source : Quadros de Pessoal 2010
3 The database Quadros de Pessoal 2010.
The database used is Quadros de Pessoal. It consists of a "longitudinal matched employer-
employee-job title" database (Cardoso et al., 2012) . This is a mandatory survey collected by
the Ministry of Employment which covers every establishment with at least one wage earner.
In this survey we observe variables to capture individual specific characteristics (such as age,
nationality, education, gender, wage, skill, work schedule, type of contract and tenure) and firm
specific characteristics (location, economic activity, number of workers, number of temporary
workers, sales and legal status).
Regarding labour earnings, Quadros de Pessoal includes base wage, other earnings received,
such as meal subsidies or overtime compensation13 , and other irregular payment. Aditionally,
the database includes information regarding the number of unionized employees at firm level.14
Based on that variable and the firm’s number of employers it is possible to build the union
density at firm level.
In general, unions receive a fee from workers, which is commonly taken by firms from the
worker’s payment and delivered to unions.15 This method reveals the condition of most workers,
making the firm’s report likely to be robust, despite being an indirect source of information.
Furthermore, Quadros de Pessoal is a survey enforced by law. Consequently, the information
must be truthfully reported. Given that it is of public use, the public control ensures extra
quality of the information provided (Cardoso et al., 2012). These particular characteristics of
the database allow greater confidence that measurement error phenomena are attenuated.
12See Part III to further information about the Database.
13Variables which control for the level of extra hours and regular schedule are present.
14 It is questioned to firms to report the number of officially known unionized employees. The accepted sources
of information are three. Or it is due to the payment of union’s fee, or to allow the worker to benefit from some
advantageous regulation or given the fact the worker is a union’s representative.(In portuguese the original question
is: Indique o número de trabalhadores sobre os quais tenha conhecimento da respectiva sindicalização (porque
são dirigentes ou delegados sindicais, porque procede ao desconto da respectiva quota sindical na remuneração
para entrega ao sindicato, ou porque o trabalhador informou que é sindicalizado nomeadamente para efeito de
determinação da regulamentação colectiva aplicável.)
15But according with articles 457, 458, 459 of the Portuguese Labour Code, a direct payment of the fee of
workers to the union is also possible.
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In the estimation of the union wage gap and the determinants of unionization we resort to
the employed workers in the year 2010, as union density - the key variable for the study - was
obtained from firms for the first time in that year. For the estimation of the decomposition of
Gelbach (2009) we use information about the employed workers from the years 1986 to 2010.
4 Determinants of unionization in Portugal.
4.1 The Union membership as a good and its characteristics.
The worker judges the utility variation caused by the consumption of the membership service
provided by unions, relative to other goods which he may consume. Theoretically, in most other
goods, the consumer is easily capable to reveal the increase in utility linked with the consumption
and the inherent loss, which is frequently related to a price paid. In case of union membership,
the worker has just a blurred idea about the benefits of consumption, posing extra uncertainty
in his choice.
Traditionally, those gains are divided into collective and individual benefits. Improvements
in the workplace conditions, enhanced job security, greater compensation, a channel to present
grievances without fear of dismissal, and insurance against arbitrary actions of the employers lead
the examples of collective benefits. As individual gains, leading examples are greater training on
the job and education, free legal services, beneficial health insurance schemes, financial assistance
or better pension schemes (Farber, 2001).
Consequently, the benefits of membership do not consist solely of extra compensation. In-
stead, the gains are partially linked with an expected broader protection which results from
collective bargaining, which of course depend on the specific terms of the agreement.
Another important contribution for the decision to acquire membership comes from the be-
haviour of co-workers. For a given union, the importance of a worker is positively correlated with
the number of union members in his sector or even in his workplace. The effort of the union to
protect a given worker is then dependent on the decision of surveyed co-workers. Blanchflower
et al. (2002) indicate that the decision to "purchase membership may be due to conform to a
social norm and thus mantain one’s reputation among co-workers".
In a different perspective, a nonunionized worker may partially benefit from collective benefits,
creating incentives to not acquire membership, partially securing its inherent benefit while not
incurring in the costs of acquiring it.
Indeed, Waddington et al. (1997) implicitly point out the importance of a broader view in the
consumption decision about union membership. Among more than ten thousand british workers
surveyed, 16.2% of the respondents pointed ideology as the reason for being unionized. Only
36.4% indicated the improved pay and conditions as their main driver for unionization. Instead,
72.1% indicated that the hypothetical support they would have in the case of a problem at work
was the reason for being unionized and 15,2% revealed as reason to join the access to free legal
advice.
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Hence, the worker’s decision to become unionized entangles more than a union wage gap
analysis or according to Blanchflower et al. (2002) "desire" or "ideological commitment". In-
stead, it assesses the full properties of a good which is union membership.
4.2 The proposed model to estimate the determinants of unionization.
To estimate the main drivers for unionization we resort to count regression models. Within count
models, the fact that some firms do not have any employee unionized creates a typical excess of
zeros’ problem which will be adressed with zero inflated models. Firms have different numbers
of employees which creates a typical problem of variation of exposure across firms to the event
of a unionized worker. To account for these properties we will resort to Zero Inflated Negative
Binomial Model (ZINB) controlled for exposure, following the proposition of Lee et al. (2001).
Consequently the Zero Inflated Negative Binomial model can be written as:
Pr(u|x, z)
{
g + (1− g) exp(−λ(x, u))
(1− g) exp(−λ(x,u))λ(x,u)
y
y!
for y = 0
for y > 0
(1)
Where y denotes the count of the expected number of unionized workers and g ∈ [0, 1] as the
zero inflated parameter - a logit with the parameter equal to a constant16 , such that:
g =
exp(τ)
1 + exp(τ)
(2)
To account for exposure variation in the negative binomial model we consider λ(x, u) =
exp(x′β + log s)u, with u following a gamma distribution17 with E(u|x) = 1 and V ar(u|x) = 1
δ
.
In this framework, the dependent variable will be the number of unionized employees at the
firm level. The model will have two groups of variables, namely, controls for the average worker,
and firm characteristics.
For worker characteristics we employ age and dummies for gender, foreigners, education and
type of contract. For firm characteristics, the model controls for the percentage of temporary
workers within the workforce of the firm, the size of the firm, its industry and the regional
location. In the present estimation we will include public servants.
4.2.1 The empirical results.
Table 3 presents the negative binomial regression model proposed. Regarding the worker’s char-
acteristics, the ZINB model presents a positive relationship between the average age and the
number of unionized workers, indicating an higher propensity of the worker at a firm to become
16 It is assumed that the probability of a firm to have a positive union density, controlled properly for its size,
is constant.
17We assume that y conditional on x and u are poisson distributed with E(.) = λ(x)u.This assumption secures
that the distribution of y, conditional on x and unconditional u is negative binomial distributed with parameters
λ(x) and δ.
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unionized as he gets older. At the same time it predicts a negative relationship between the
dependent variable and the share of foreigners in the company.
Table 3: Estimation of the Model proposed.
(The base group in the education dummies is no education, in the firm size dummies
is a firm with a workforce between 1 and 4 workers, and in the regional dummies is the North region.)
However, the most important aspect to consider is that the remaining worker’s characteristics
considered, namely schooling or gender, are not statistically significant. This means that the
expected number of unionized workers is not expected to change due to changes in the education
of the work force or due to its gender composition.
The expected incidence rate of unionization is positive, statistically significant and soundly
correlated with firm size. In larger firms the average worker will have more propensity to be
unionized than in a comparative but smaller firm. The reasoning underlying the result can be
the economics of scale of unions, which prefer to unionize a larger firm, marginally benefiting
more than the incremental cost that the increased firm size represents.
In another perspective, there is a negative correlation between the increase in the share of
non-permanent workers and the union density. When the legal bond between the worker and
the firm is weaker, the average worker has less incentives to acquire membership because he is
not commited in a long-term relationship. Hence, he may not collect a significant share of the
future gains of unionization. The mere prospect of becoming a permanent worker is not sufficient
to guarantee an incidence rate of unionization as registered in that group. The same reasoning
applies to foreign workers.
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Searching the industry controls included in the model, which consists of twenty sectors of
activity18 , we find evidence of the claim presented by Torres et al. (2013). If we rank the sectors
which have greater incidence rates of unionization we find in the top positions, respectively,
the Banking and Insurance sector, the Public Administration and National Defense sector, the
Electricity and Gas sector and the Transportation and Storage sector. The three sectors which
are not public are dominated by previously publicly owned companies, and are protected from
competition.
Overall, the propensity of the average worker to become unionized does not rely significantly
on its own characteristics but is considerably linked with the firm - the size and the sector of
activity definitely matter. Moreover, the average worker has more incentives to be unionized if
he is more job protected.
5 Model to estimate union-nonunion wage differentials.
5.1 A review of models to estimate the marginal effect of union density
on Wages.
A variety of estimation procedures to measure the union wage gap have proliferated.19 Hirsch
(2003) stated that "there never has been a consensus on the most appropriate methods by which
union gaps should be estimated".
Regularly reproduced, there are selection models based on the Heckman-Lee procedure and
non-selection models founded on regular cross section models with control for union density or a
separation of the study about the wage equation between unionized and non-unionized workers.
Another relevant bulk of models are panel data models with the same principles of the non-
selection ones, but focusing on the individuals which change union status overtime, resorting to
fixed effects methods.
The selection models are criticized due to the multiplicity of distinct estimates existing in
the literature. The lack of a two-sided selection process is, in most models, another defect, as its
presence in the relation between workers and employers has been broadly evidenced.20 Farber
(2001) refers that the impact of the double selection on union wage gaps is unclear.
Even if the Hechman-Lee procedure is implemented to partially overcome the issues relating
18According with CAE - Código de Actividade Empresarial (the portuguese code of economic activity)
19Lewis (1986) differenciates gains, which is the comparison between the actual wage of an unionized worker
and its counterfactual, and gaps, which is the relative gain between an unionized and a non-unionized worker, in
the same specific observable characteristics.
20The "workers choice" is dependent on the gains realized, and the gains are correlated with the quality of
the workers, creating a selection process, where lower skilled workers gain more from being unionized than high
skilled workers (Blanchflower et al.,2002, Card, 1996; Farber, 2001).
The second typical selection process is related with the firms’ choice. Firstly it is due to "queuing". It relies
on the fact that some workers which decided to be unionized may not find unionized jobs. Also, the incentive
for employers of unionized workplaces to upgrade the skill levels of their work forces in order to offset part of the
higher wage reveals selectivity issues (Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Lewis 1986, Hirsch, 2003b). However, Card
(1996) and Freeman (1986) evidenced that skill upgrading has at most a modest impact.
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to selection, the absence of valid instruments for wage in the unionization decision process (Lewis,
1986) and, more broadly, the "untestable" exclusion restrictions of variables assumed to directly
influence union status but not the earnings, often cloud the joint normality of the errors - a
central requirement for the consistency of the procedure. Cardoso et al. (2005) concluded that
if selectivity issues partially result from the correlation between worker unobserved quality and
unionization status, only longitudinal data can bypass that handicap.21
For non-selection models, Lewis (1986) and Breda (2012) depict the sensitivity of estimates
to the set of control variables chosen as a reason of warning, indicating that the union control
variable may surreptitiously be partially captured by other controls.
A smaller but existing segment of non-selection models in the literature come with the sep-
aration of the database between unionized workers and non-unionized workers (Farber, 2001).
However, this presents the same issues of control choice referred in the other non-selection models,
given a potential different behaviour of the errors of unionized and non-unionized equations.
The panel models are sensitive to the controls used, since ommited time-varying variables
may create bias as in cross section. By construction, they assume that the individuals who
change union status do not have unobserved skills that are correlated with the change in the
status, which may be unrealistic.
Another issue mentioned by Blanchflower et al. (2002), is that panel data models are often
affected by measurement error which attenuates the estimates of the effects. Freeman (1984)
detailed that those biases may be severe when the rate of mobility between union and nonunion
jobs is low, even in the presence of a moderate measurement error.
Altogether, after a review of 200 empirical studies, Lewis (1986) takes the view that OLS is
the capable way to approach the issue despite its "upward bias resulting from the omission of
control variables correlated with the union status variable". Freeman (1984), reinforced this view,
suggesting that cross-section estimates based on OLS "bound the true impact of unionism" and
panel data estimates would consist in its lower bound. Later, Card (1996) denoted empirically
that in OLS the selection biases referred tend to cancel each other, allowing those estimates to be
approximately consistent. Farber (2001) and Robinson (1989) defended broadly the same idea,
indicating that this bias can go upwards or downwards due to the unobserved heterogeneity.
Clearly, any approach used in estimating of the union wage gap demands great care, as
workers’ unobserved characteristics potentially alter wages other than through the simple process
of unionization (Blanchflower et al., 2002).
5.2 The proposed estimation procedure for the union wage gap.
5.2.1 The methodology of the model.
The method proposed to estimate the union wage gap is a two step procedure. In the first step
a union density-specific fixed effects model will be estimated. The model can be expressed as:
21 Implicitly it is assumed that the sample partition methodology presented in Farber (2001) is not a comparable
way to circunvenct the selectivity issue.
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ln yw,f,u = αu + xw,fβ + ew,f,u (3)
In the model above, ln(yw,f ) is the log of monthly gross compensation for each individual
worker (w = 1, ...,W ) working for each firm (f = 1, ..., F ), which has a given union density rate
(u = 1, ..., U).
In this extended Mincerian wage equation we consider the following sources of wage variabil-
ity:
1. Specific observable characteristics of the worker and his firm (xw,f );
2. Union density’s constant heterogeneity, potentially connected with differences in compen-
sation caused by the level of union density at firm level (αu) ;
3. Unexplained error term (ew,f,u).
The fixed effect resulting from this step will represent a different intercept for each worker’s
equation, capturing the constant unexplained impact of the firm’s union density in the worker’s
compensation. Given the exclusion of a control for worker’s unionization, the fixed effect becomes
the effect of the union’s density on the compensation of the worker.
The dimension of the panel allows the estimation to give more weight to larger firms, as the
union fixed effect is calculated and linked to each worker instead of the firm. Consequently, the
fixed effects will implicitly account for the size of firms.22
In the second step, a Kernel Regression with Epanechnikov kernel function is implemented
to the estimated union’s fixed effects. By this process, a weighted average of the fixed effect is
computed for each firm’s existing union density in the database.23 Following Cameron and Trivedi
(2005), the classical method to define the parameter for the bandwith of those neighborhoods
is used and is considered double the bandwith in the estimation.24 The second step can be
presented as:
αw,u =m (Uw,u) + τw,u (4)
In the above equation, m(.) is an undefined function which relates the effect of union density
in each worker’s compensation (αw,u) with the union density at firm level (Uw,u). The model
accounts for a well behaved error term (τw,u).
22The non introduction of the size of firms in the semi-parametric formulation of the first step will be explained
further ahead.
23The number of local estimates used in the kernel regression should meet the number of unique union den-
sity’s values which have associated an union fixed effect. Hence, the number of local estimates should meet the
cardinality of the set of union densities of firms with at least one worker.
24The classical plug-in estimate: h∗ = 1.3643× δ×N−0.2 × s,with δ equal to 1.7188, due to the Epanechnikov
specification. N is equal to the resulting number of fixed effects linked to distinct levels of union density and s
the standard deviation of the resulting fixed effect variable linked to distinct levels of union density.
By just accounting for distinct values of union density we account for the excessive repetition of fixed effects
caused by its link with each worker.
The plug-in estimate used is the double of the h calculated by the classical estimate.
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This method allows the estimation of local weighted union wage gaps, which at the aggregate
level results in a nonlinear semiparametric estimation of a curve that relates the impact of union
wage gap with the existing degree of union density at firm level. To improve the interpretation
of the results a convenient normalization implies that the average weight of the fixed effect for a
non existing unionization is set equal to zero.25
As presented by Farber (2001), in the non-selection models, where selection issues are present,
the union gap in wages "can be considered as the average difference in wages between union and
non-union workers, but cannot be interpreted as the effect of union membership on the wage of
a particular worker".
In this model, given the specification of the variable union density, the interpretation should
be the average difference in wages for the workers at a given firm caused by a specific union
density level of firm, ceteris paribus on several controls used. This would allows us to compare
the difference in wages of workers caused by different levels of union densities which will be
summarized by the curve estimated.
5.2.2 The set of variables to be used.
The choice of the set of variables to include as controls in the model should be carefully discussed,
as it may blur the true effect of unionism by including controls which partially represent it.
Nervertheless, Lewis (1986), Blanchflower and Bryson (2002) refer that, despite the dependence
of the estimates of union wage gap on the controls used, the difference is not severe.
The proper definition of the wage variable should deserve attention, as if not properly defined
it may exclude some types of remuneration which are specially targeted in collective bargaining.
Hirsch (2003) included broad occupation and industry controls, as detailed variables for
occupation are "associated with an higher union wage gap" and detailed controls for industry
"lower union gap estimates". Blanchflower and Bryson (2002) exclude occupation and include
detailed industry dummies.
The stated selection bias on the process of unionization based on worker skills and the ex-
pected skill upgrading caused by the collective bargaining also advises the exclusion of controls
for workers’ observed skills.
In Portugal, bargaining takes place on the structure of contracts and the definition of job
titles. Thus, job titles and types of contracts are ordinarily indistinguishable from the collective
bargaining process.
Based on Farber (1999), quits are an inverse function of tenure and quits are lower in more
unionized firms. Also, a positive correlation between firm’s size and union density is often
assumed. Thus, tenure and firm’s size controls are commonly excluded (Hirsch, 2003).
The presence of the public sector in the estimation may average out two different realities.
First and foremost, the legal structure differs in both sectors regarding compensation, and often
25The relevant interpretation is a comparison of union wage gaps per levels of union density. Consequently the
normalization does not curb the generality of the analysis.
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its composition by types of earnings is not alike. Secondly, the historical blockage to the firing
process in public service in Portugal, which leads to a stronger position of unions in the collective
bargaining process, creates a severely disconnectedly reality. Finally the political pressure exerted
by each sector is different. Consequently it is advisable to separate the analyses (Hirsch, 2003).
Ducan and Stafford (1980) argued that unionized jobs inherently have more adverse working
conditions. The effect of working conditions is partially depicted in occupation and industry con-
trols (Hirsch, 2003). In Portugal, given the highly regulated labour market, working conditions
are also a matter of major concern in collective bargaining, and largely regulated at industry
level. Again, accounting for this effect by resorting to sectorial controls seems appropriate.
The impact of union density will only be fully captured when the total compensation of
workers is considered. For instance the composition of compensation may change with the
increase in union bargaining power. It will happen if one believes that unions tend to place
greater emphasis on some components of the compensation and firms on others, resulting in
a different evolution for each type of compensation. Consequently, the remuneration variable
should be based on compensation.
The estimation of the first step of the model will have compensation as the independent
variable, including base wage, subsidies on shifts, extra hours, meal subsidies, and other payments
offered. Regarding regressors, worker specific regressors will be included, namely gender and
foreign worker dummies, age and age squared and a set of dummies for the level of education. At
firm level, it will included controls on industry based on CAE 1 and on geographical distribution
based on NUTS II. As a second possible parametrization broad occupation controls will also be
inserted.
The exclusion of other available regressors followed the methodology presented.
5.2.3 The advantages and limitations of the model proposed.
The model proposed presents at least two relevant properties:
1. The model assumes that union wage gap has a non-parametric relationship between wages
and the current firm union density and its specification form is unknown. The model
proposed, by estimating a union wage gap for each level of firm’s union density, offers
greater flexibility to the estimation, and can approximate the typical cross-section models,
namely the pooled OLS estimation, if the results obtained are linearized;
2. The estimation accounts for the size of firms as the fixed effects are computed using infor-
mation at worker level.
The set of limitations of the proposed model are in line with the conventional models proposed
in literature, namely:
1. The model is captive to the set of variables used. The definition of the set of variables and
the type of wages to use is key to define the final estimate;
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2. The model relies on the estimation of fixed-effects. Therefore it is sensitive to measurement
errors, which may induce a measurement bias.
3. To be properly estimated, the model requires a high density panel data, in order to not
have sections of the final estimated curve heavily dependent on a sparsity generated by a
small number of firms, specially when the distribution of firms per levels of unionization is
highly assymetric, as in the Portuguese case (figure 1).
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Figure 1: Levels of union density per firm (top) and worker (bottom).
The database minimizes the second limitation due to the union’s legal framework and the
nature of the database. It also minimizes the third limitation, as the database depicts the
entire population of employees and private companies in Portugal, not being captive of
large neighbourhoods of union densities without firms’ observations. Regarding the first
limitation, standard theory was used to guide the choice of the controls.
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5.2.4 The empirical results.
The estimation of the union wage gap. The estimates for the private sector of the first
step of the model based on the two specifications defined is presented in table 5.
Tigure 5 - Estimation of the proposed models. (Note: agesq is the square of age)
(The base group in the education dummies is no education, in the firm size dummies
is a firm with a workforce between 1 and 4 workers, and in the regional dummies is the North region.)
The main results are in line with standard theory. Compensation grows with age until around
56 years in the standard case. Both specifications extracted the well established gender gap (20,06
percent in the standard case and 15,63 percent in the alternative scenario)26 , and an expected
loss of compensation for foreigners (8,85 percent in the standard scenario and 3,78 percent in the
alternative). As for education both models present an increase in compensation with education
which is consistent with standard theory.
The graph in figure 2 results from the second step of the estimation, for both specifications
considered. As in Lewis (1986) and Blanchfllower and Bryson (2002), the difference in the final
26On Cardoso et al. (2012), the raw gender gap was 21,3% and when controlled to worker’s age and tenure the
gap reduces to 20,5%.
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estimates obtained is not severe. Hence, further analysis will lie on the standard set of controls.
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Figure 2 - The curves resulting from the two step model with both specifications.
The shape of the curve evidences a non linear relationship with a plateau resemblance. The
increase in union density does not represent a monotonic increase in the union wage gap for the
workers of a specific workplace. This relationship may be wrongly assumed if it is considered a
strictly increasing relationship between the union wage gap and bargaining power proxied by the
union density at firm level.
Instead, the model outcome depicts a strictly increasing relationship between union density
and the union wage gap for the interval of densities between 0 percent and 51,54 percent, cor-
responding to a maximum of 21,42 percent of the union wage gap. After this point, the union
wage gap stabilizes, at lower levels, with an average wage gap of 19,76 percent.
Theorethically, the union wage gap is increasing with the increase of the bargaining power
of the union, but the bargaining power of the union is highest when the majority of the workers
are unionized. After the majority is obtained the workplace may be considered as if it were fully
unionized, as the gains in total compensation are fully realized for its workers.
Comparison of the estimates with the consensus for the US and UK. The wage
gap found in US should be compared with the estimates provided with some caution. The
requirement that workers and unions organize the workplace (Farber, 2001), often resulting in
voting to decide the workplace unionization, makes the workplace fully unionized if the majority
of the workers vote for it. Consequently, the union wage gap reported compares a workplace
without any formal and direct effect of unions with a workplace with virtually full unionization.
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Lewis (1986) in what is considered "the father figure of this literature" by Blanchflower and
Bryson (2002) concluded that the union wage gap for the US is around 15 percent, given the
framework presented. To find a comparable number for Portugal, it can be considered that after
51,53 percent of union density the union wage gap is stabilized and the compensation benefits
of unionization are fully collected. Henceforth the comparable gap is between 18,83 percent and
21,42 percent with an average of 19,76 percent.
In the UK the framework is closer to the Portuguese reality.27 According to Blanchflower
and Bryson (2002) the consensus is that the union wage gap in the UK is around 10 percent.
Consequently the Portuguese collective bargaining framework creates the conditions for a
higher union wage gap when compared with its American and British counterparts.
Composition effects. The estimation of the two step model for each component of the
worker’s compensation reveals composition effects of the union wage gap. The components con-
sidered are the base wage and four typical allowances - meals, overtime, shifts and bonuses not
attached to productivity.28 Ordinarily meals and bonuses are wage supplements while overtime,
shifts and base payments are considered working time related.
Until the majority of workers become unionized, the union wage gap is on average created
through the contribution of the working time components, while it is partialy mitigated by a
negative gap of the wage supplements, as shown in figure 3.
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Figure 3 - The union gap by type of compensation.
27The extent of special legislation to enlarge the franshise of the agreements is larger in Portugal, with proem-
inence of Industry agreements instead of company level settlements as it is common in UK(Fulton, 2011).
28A leading example of these bonuses is diuturnidades which is an extra compensation which benefits the
stability of the worker in the firm.
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When the majority of the workers are unionized the wage gap stabilizes. However, the
plateau indicated in figure 3 is attained with significant composition effects. Figure 3 indicates
that when the union density surpasses 50 percent, the wage suplements contribute more to the
union wage gap while working time components contribute less. In 2010, the wage supplements
had a beneficial tax incidence, allowing the union to benefit from the increase in payment of very
visible components of the compensation, which most of the times are equal for every worker, and
the firm could increase the worker’s net income without incurring in more costs. Albert Rees
(1960) presented preferential tax treatment and unionization as the engines for the increase in
the share of wage supplements within compensation. This seems to be the case.
Comparision with Pooled OLS. The estimation of the union wage gap resorting to a typical
pooled OLS with the same controls as used in the two step model can be summed up as:
ln yw,f = αuf + βxw,f + εw,f (5)
In that model, uf is a control for the level of union density at firm level, and consequently α
is the linear parameter which relates, ceteris paribus, the union density with compensation. The
estimates from this model are shown in table 6.
To linearize the estimated non-parametric fuction obtained in the step two of the model, the
following simple regression is estimated:
ln yw,f,u = γα̂u + νw,f,u (6)
In that equation α̂u is the union density’s fixed effect estimated in the first step of the model
presented to estimate the union wage gap, and γ represents the slope of the linearized straight
line.
Both methods to obtain a linear relationship between the union wage gap and the levels of
union density provide an identical result. This enables the model proposed to approximate quite
substantially the standard procedure proposed in the literature to estimate the union wage gap
(if the controls used are the same).
In figure 4, there is a comparison between the two step model estimation, the subsequent
linearization and the estimation of the marginal effect from the pooled OLS when the standard-
ization is neglected (if the standardization is not neglected, the linearization and the marginal
effect from the pooled OLS produce the same linear curve).
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Figure 8 - Estimation of the Pooled OLS Model.
(The base group in the education dummies is no education, in the firm size dummies
is a firm with a workforce between 1 and 4 workers, and in the regional dummies is the North region.)
Figure 4 - The union wage gap through the pooled OLS and the linearization
of the two step model approaches.
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This approximation confirms the importance of a non-linear specification in approaching the
estimation of union wage gaps. If that is neglected, and a pooled OLS is implemented, it will
bound the true value of unionism, but clearly its lack of flexibility would increase the estimation
of the union wage gap especially for firms with very high union densities.
6 Gelbach’s decomposition of the union wage gap.
6.1 The methodology of the model.
With the estimation of the union wage gap and its composition in terms of compensation’s
components, the question about its sources arises. In this context, we estimate the channels un-
derlying the creation of the gap by considering the contribution of the allocation of workers across
firms, its distribution among occupations and its own constant but unobserved characteristics.
Thus, we are considering the contribution of the productivity of the workers, its occupational dis-
tribution, the compensation policies and human resources strategies of the firms, to the building
up of the gap.
According to Cardoso et al. (2012) "[Gelbach’s exact decomposition] allows for an unequivocal
quantification of the portion of the gender pay gap due to each variable of interest". We adapt
this procedure to the issue of the union wage gap.
A first extended mincerian equation is estimated accounting for worker, firm and job-title
constant heterogeneity, through the estimation of the following model:
ln yw,f,j,t = θw + φf + ψj +Xw,f,j,tβ + γt + νw,f,j,t (7)
In the above equation ln(yw,f,j,t) is the log of the real monthly compensation for each in-
dividual worker w(w = 1, ...,W) working in each firm f(f = 1, ..., F ) and holding a given job
title j(j = 1, ..., J). X is a (N×L) matrix with controls for age and age squared. There are
t(t = 1, ..., Tw) years considered in the database. There are Tw observations for each worker w,
and thus the number of observations will be equal to N(N = Tw× W ). Yearly dummies are
introduced (γt). We resort to a three high dimensional fixed effects methodology presented by
Guimarães and Portugal (2010) to obtain the exact OLS solution of a linear regression.
The average, per firm, of the worker’s fixed effect and the job title’s fixed effects is computed
allowing the merger of the databases from 1986 to 2009 with the one for the year 2010. The
union density, defined at firm level, is introduced. Therefore the model becomes:
ln yw,f = δθ θ̂f + δφφ̂f + δψψ̂f +Xw,fβ + ξDRDRf + νw,f (8)
On the merged model φ̂f , θ̂f , ψ̂f represent respectively the firm’s fixed effect, the averages
per firm of the worker’s fixed effect and the job title’s fixed effect.
Consequently, we consider as potential sources of wage variability:
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1. The average per firm of the worker’s time-invariant heterogeneity, potentially connected
with his ability or productivity
(
θ̂f
)
;
2. The firm’s time-invariant heterogeneity, likely to be connected with its compensation policy
and human resources strategy
(
φ̂f
)
;
3. The average per firm of the job-title’s time-invariant heterogeneity, linked with the influence
of not controlled occupational distribution on the wage formation
(
ψ̂f
)
;
4. The observed characteristics of workers, firms, and the economy (Xw,f )
5. Union density control to account for differences in compensation caused by the level of
union density at firm level (DRf );
6. Unexplained random variable (νw,f ).
As a second step, the decomposition of Gelbach (2009) is considered. A base model is esti-
mated excluding the worker’s, firm’s and job-title’s fixed effects:
ln yw,u = Xw,fb+ ηDRDRf + εw,f (9)
Then, by using the decomposition of Gelbach, it is obtained the following regression:29
η̂DR − ξ̂DR = µ̂θ + µ̂φ + µ̂ψ (10)
With the previous result we are then capable to obtain the contribution of the coefficient
associated with the union density on the worker’s wage by worker’s fixed effect (δ̂φφ̂f ), by the
firm’s fixed effect (δ̂θ θ̂f ), the job title’s fixed effects (δ̂ψψ̂f ).
6.2 A generalization of Gelbach’s Decomposition: The decomposition
of the nonlinear semiparametric curve for the union wage gap.
An interesting generalization to consider is to decompose the non-parametric curve estimated
for the union wage gap in its worker, firm and job-title fixed effect components. The procedure
is identical but the base model becomes a fixed effect model in the spirit of the second part of
the union wage gap determination model:
ln yw,f,u = αu + δθ θ̂f + δφφ̂f + δψψ̂f +Xw,fβ + νw,f,u (11)
Then following Gebalch’s (2009), the three fixed effect models are regressed as:
29See Appendix 1 for details on the Gelbach’s Decomposition.
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δ̂θθ̂f = αu +Xw,fβ + κw,f,u (12)
δ̂φφ̂f = αu +Xw,fβ + ηw,u (13)
δ̂ψψ̂f = αu +Xw,fβ + 0w,u (14)
Finally, a Kernel Regression with Epanechnikov kernel function, in the spirit of the second
step of the model for the determination of the union wage gap is implemented:
α̂θu = mαθu (Uf ) + τw,u (15)
α̂φu = mαφu (Uf ) + ρw,u (16)
α̂ψu = mαψu (Uf ) + ζw,u (17)
Consequently, the initially estimated curve is then decomposed in three curves representing
the contribution of the worker’s, firm’s and job-title’s fixed effects. The unexplained contribution
is obtained by performing this step using the union’s fixed effect of equation (11). Then, the
final result would be:
α̂u − α̃u = mαθu (Uf ) +mαφu (Uf ) +mαψu (Uf )
In the above result α̂u is the curve estimated in the union wage gap determination model.α̃uis
the unexplained component of the decomposition.
6.3 The Empirical Results.
6.4 Previous notes about Quadros de Pessoal database.
There are two challenges in the database used to approach the Gelbach’s decomposition of the
union wage gap:
1. The union density is reported only for 2010 but the fixed effects are obtained from 1986 to
2009;
2. There is a break in the series of firms and workers’ identifiers between 2009 and 2010.
To bypass this challenge we matched firms between 2009 and 2010 considering several
key informations capable of uniquely identify them. In this context, we have used the
year of creation, sector of activity, with the maximum degree of atomicity allowed in the
portuguese code of firm activity, and the location (region and municipality). By doing this
process we were capable to match 40% of the firms present in 2010 database and 53% of
the employment, which provides a feasible database for the estimation.
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6.4.1 About the Decomposition of the Coefficient and the decomposition of the
curve.
The results of the decomposition are exposed in table 9. The worker fixed effect represent the
permanent characteristics of the individual which influence the total compensation received.
The unobserved characteristics are associated with the ability of the worker which, despite being
unobservable by the model, is detected by the employer providing feedback on its compensation.
Ordinarily, it is associated with the productivity of the worker.
The decomposition indicates that the existence of a full unionized firm represents lower pro-
ductivity of the average unionized worker. In fact, the idea of skill upgrading as a response to
the union wage gap doesn’t seem to take place in Portugal, as the firms which have to pay higher
union wage gaps do not have a more productive work force.
Regarding the firm fixed effect, it represents observed and unobserved human resources’
choices or unobserved compensation policy’s choices which influence the total compensation of
workers. Gelbach’s decomposition shows that a full unionized firm sees its total compensation
policy severely changed, meaning that the presence of unions is associated with the way the firm
compensates the workers.
The job title’s fixed effect represents the influence on payment which comes from the position
held by the worker in the firm. Usually it is taken as an "occupation premium". The fact that
a full unionized firm sees the average job title increase means that effectively the union bargains
on the definition of job positions and is effective in upgrading the workers in the compensation
tables. By doing so, unions extract an extra compensation to their workers.
This evidence seems to confirm that in Portugal unions not only bargain on compensation
itself. Having said that, the allocation into job-titles appears to play a small role. The underlying
reasoning in excluding occupations from the benchmark model used in this study is reinforced.
Table 9 - The pooled OLS Union Wage Gap and the Gelbach Decomposition of the Gap.
(Note: All coefficients are statistically significant at 1% and are presented in log-points scale)
In order to circumvent the upward bias on the estimates and to robustly check the results,
non-linear semiparametric curves which gives the contribution of union density to each fixed
effect and to the unexplained contribution were also produced. They allow to see, for each
level of union density, the relevant contributions to worker, compensation policy, and job title’s
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heterogeneity of the bargaining.
The generalization of Gelbach’s Decomposition evidences the same stylized facts as the analy-
sis of the coefficient decomposition. The unique relevant addition is the correction of the job title
effect for firms with a union density higher than 70%. The apparent impairment of the union’s
channel to improve job titles of the unionized workers is compensated by a stronger effect in the
compensation policy of firms.
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Figure 11 - The generalization of the Gelbach decomposition.
In a nutshell, the conclusion should be that a high level of union density implies union
wage gaps which comes from the ability of unions to alter the compensation policies and/or to
artificially upgrade the worker’s job titles. Higher levels of union density reduce the average
worker’s productivity.
7 Conclusion
In Portugal, the union membership officially reported in Quadros de Pessoal is 10.38 percent,
while the country’s union coverage is 92 percent, representing a significant misaligment between
those who are members and those who benefit from membership.
Despite their low membership - based on workers which have more employment protection
- unions are still capable of effectively influencing firm’s behaviours. Unions are more active in
larger firms, which operate in sectors protected from competition and hence have potentially
higher rents to extract. Unions find their natural conditions and benefits from economies of
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scale.
When the majority of workers is unionized, and hence bargaining power is clear, the union
wage gap is on average 19,76 percent, under the preferred specification. That compares with the
15% and 10% of the American and British comparable counterparts, respectively.
The model proposed for the union wage gap shows the importance of considering non-linear
specifications in the estimation of union wage gaps, otherwise the gap may be inflated due to
the misspecification of the functional form of the model. Precisely, the current approach keeps
the capability to approximate the OLS, while it shows important composition effects, such as
the substitution effect among types of compensation. As the bargaining power increases, there
is a substitution from compensation attached to working time to wage supplements, probably
because the latter have a more beneficial tax treatment and provides unions with more visibility.
The decomposition exercise showed that the union wage gap is mostly materialized in the
firm’s compensation policy. Modest effects were obtained for the notion that unions influence
the promotion rules and the job title’s definition. This exercise also indicates that the average
worker of a more unionized firm is less productive.
8 Appendix
Appendix 1 - Demonstration of Gelbach’s Unambiguous Decomposition
(2009).
The extended Mincerian wage equation is the standard model for the decomposition and it is
estimated:
ln yw,f = δθ θ̂f + δφφ̂f + δψψ̂f +Xw,fβ + νw,f (18)
This representation is identical to equation (6), but the union density’s control is included in the
matrix X, which has size (N × L + 1). The base model considered excludes every fixed effect
excepting the union density’s fixed effect:30
ln yw,f =Xw,fb+ εw,f (19)
Using the ordinary properties of OLS we have for any model, and particularly for the base model:
X
′
w,fεw,f = 0 (20a)
b̂ =
[
X
′
w,fXw,f
]−1
X
′
w,f [ln yw,f ] (20b)
30Again, union density’s fixed effect is included in the matrix X for simplicity.
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Define PX =
[
X
′
w,fXw,f
]−1
X
′
w,f .Replacing ln yw,f by considering the standard model we have:
b̂ = PX
[
δ̂θ θ̂f + δ̂φφ̂f + δ̂ψψ̂f +Xw,f β̂ + νw,f
]
(21)
b̂− β̂ = PX δ̂θθ̂f +PX δ̂φφ̂f +PX δ̂ψψ̂f (22)
Consequently, we have regressions of the (normalized) fixed effects on each regressor of the base
model, such as:
δ̂θθ̂f = Xw,fµ+ ξw,f (23)
δ̂φφ̂f = Xw,fµ+ ϕw,f (24)
δ̂ψψ̂f = Xw,fµ+ ωw,f (25)
In the above equations ξw,f , ϕw,f ,ωw,f are error terms. As a final result we have:
η̂DR − ξ̂DR = µ̂θ + µ̂φ + µ̂ψ (26)
where ξ̂DRand η̂DR are the coeficient associated with the union density control on equations
(19) and (20), respectively, and µ̂θ, µ̂φ, µ̂ψ are coeficient estimates associated with union density
control on equations (24)-(26). The decomposition of the union density coeficient by the worker’s,
firm’s and job-title’s fixed effect is then completed.
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